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Status Quaestionis
In his Preface to Metaphysics (1939), Jacques Maritain 
warns that “it is a radical error to restrict the object of the intellect to the 
object of the -rst operation of the mind.”1 /anks to texts such as q. 5, 
a. 3 of St. /omas’s commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, the seventh 
reply in d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 of book I of the Scriptum on the Sentences (here-
a7er simply Scriptum), and the corpus of Scriptum I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, it is 
the common opinion of the twentieth century’s great existential /omists 
that, whereas the object of the intellect’s -rst activity (or operation) is the 
essences of things, the object of the second operation of the intellect is the 
act of existence or to-be (esse).2 In the texts just cited, Aquinas distinguishes 
two operations of the intellect, which correspond to two distinct aspects in 
things: their nature, quiddity, or essence, on the one hand, and their existence 
1   Jacques Maritain, A A A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being (New York: 
Sheed & Ward, 1948), 20.
2   Citations from Aquinas, when not from the Leonine edition, Opera Omnia (Rome: 
Commisio Leonina, 1882–), are thus: In I sent. citations from Scriptum super libros 
Sententiarum, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, vol. 1 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); In I–XII 
metaphys. citations from In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. 
M. R. Cathala and Raymundi Spiazzi, 3rd ed. (Italy: Marietti, 1977); ST citations 
from Summa !eologiae, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, 8 vols. (Lander, 
WY: Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012). All translations from 
Latin are my own.
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or to-be (esse), on the other. /e -rst operation, says /omas, “pertains to 
[respicit] the nature of a thing,” or put diFerently, “apprehends [apprehen-
dit] the quiddities of things.” /e second, however, “pertains to [respicit] 
the being [esse] of a thing,” or put diFerently, “comprehends [comprehendit] 
the being [esse] of a thing.” /ese two operations have traditionally been 
named “simple apprehension” and “judgment,” respectively.
/e principal authors espousing this existentialist thesis are Maritain3 
and Étienne Gilson,4 for whom the cognition of esse in judgment plays an 
essential role in both epistemology and metaphysics. /is paper restricts 
itself to considering the metaphysical thesis itself that esse is cognized in 
judgment—that is, that the object of the second operation of the intellect 
is esse.
/e standard response to existential /omism in regard to the cogni-
tion of esse was given -rst by Father Louis-Marie Régis in his 1951 review 
of Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers.5 It was subsequently developed at 
considerable length by Ralph McInerny in various places.6 /e heart of the 
3   Maritain, Preface; Maritain, Existence and the Existent (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
2015); Maritain, “ReQections on Wounded Nature,” in Untrammeled Approaches, 
trans. Bernard Doering, /e Collected Works of Jacques Maritain 20 (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997); Maritain, !e Peasant of the 
Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).
4   Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Ponti-cal 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949); Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959). Besides Maritain and Gilson, the thesis 
that esse is the object of judgment can also be found in the leading second- and 
third-generation existential /omists such as Joseph Owens and John Knasas, 
whose opinions will not be discussed in detail in this paper. See, e.g.: John Knasas, 
“Esse as the Target of Judgment in Rahner and Aquinas,” !e !omist 51, no. 2 
(1987): 222–45, at 231; Joseph Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” !e 
Review of Metaphysics 29, no. 4 (1976): 670–90, at 675 and 678–80; Owens, An 
Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston, TX: Center for /omistic Studies, 
1985), 47.
5   Louis-Marie Régis, “Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers,” !e Modern School-
man 28, no. 2 (1951): 111–25. /is article along with Gilson’s reply was reprinted 
in the appendix to Gilson’s own Being and Some Philosophers, 216–32.
6   Ralph McInerny, “Some Notes on Being and Predication,” !e !omist 22, no. 3 
(1959): 315–35; McInerny, “Notes on Being and Predication,” Laval théologique 
et philosophique 15, no. 2 (1959): 236–74. /ese McInerny articles were combined 
and republished in a later collection: Being and Predication (Washington, DC: 
/e Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 173–228. (/ese later-edited 
versions are those we cite here.) McInerny’s arguments were then abbreviated and 
restated as part of a historical study of Gilson’s impact on Catholic intellectual life 
in: Preambula Fidei: !omism and the God of the Philosophers (Washington, DC: 
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argument made by these two authors against existential /omism consists 
in pointing to a text in lecture 5 of Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s 
Peryermenias (De interpreatione) in which Aquinas appears to say quite 
plainly that “is” signi-es esse, that “is” is a verb, and that verbs signify 
concepts in the -rst operation of the intellect, not the second.
In response to this objection, existential /omists could either, as 
Gilson does, call into question the value of Aquinas’s Aristotelian 
commentaries for revealing Aquinas’s own thoughts7 or, more plausibly, 
point out that none of the existential /omists deny a concept of existence 
in the -rst operation.8 Rather, all they deny is that our understanding of 
existence originates in the -rst, rather than the second, operation. So, even 
if Father Régis and McInerny are right to see in In peryermenias a simple 
concept of esse, this need not contradict the existential /omist thesis that 
esse is properly cognized only in judgment.
It is the contention of the present paper that both sides of this dispute 
are mistaken. For reasons that have not been previously explored, we must 
deny the existentialist thesis that the object of the second operation is esse. 
Moreover, we must reject the Régis-McInerny interpretation of In pery-
ermenias in which that text is taken as describing a particular concept of 
existence cognized in the -rst operation of the intellect. To reach these two 
conclusions, we proceed as follows. First, we present a chronological sketch 
of Maritain’s understanding of the relation of esse to judgment, using him 
as the chief representative of the existential school and only citing Gilson 
a7erward to con-rm our previous interpretation of Maritain and to 
suggest that his view is generally representative of the existential school. 
Second, using texts in which Aquinas distinguishes the two operations of 
the intellect, we consider whether it is correct to interpret Aquinas’s phrase 
“secunda operatio respicit ipsum esse rei” (“the second operation pertains 
to the being of a thing”) as indicating that esse is the object of the second 
operation of the intellect or even properly cognized in that operation. Our 
/e Catholic University of America Press, 2006).
7   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 224: “In his commentaries on Aristotle does 
Saint /omas always express his deepest personal thought on a given question?” 
8   See, e.g.: Maritain, Preface, 20; Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 19 and 36; 
Maritain, “ReQections,” 220–21; Maritain, Peasant, 138; Owens, An Elementary 
Christian Metaphysics, 57–65. Gilson is somewhat less clear than the other two 
existential /omists just cited, but he does seem to admit a concept of existence 
in the -rst operation (!omist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge, trans. Mark 
Wauck [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012], 198). In any case, Gilson certainly 
allows a concept of ens in simple apprehension, and this presumably includes a 
concept of existence (Elements, 135).
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conclusion is negative. Having rejected the thesis of the existential /om-
ists, we consider whether the standard alternative—here represented by 
McInerny—is any better. Although both Father Régis and McInerny are 
somewhat unclear in their interpretation of In peryermenias, both seem to 
view existence as falling under the proper object of the intellect’s -rst oper-
ation in a way co-equal with that in which the quiddities of things do so. 
/ey interpret Aquinas as describing “is” as signifying a particular concept 
in the -rst operation of the intellect—namely, the concept of existence. 
I argue, in contrast, that the text in question does not give us reason to 
think that there is a particular concept of existence signi-ed by “is” falling 
in any direct way under the proper object of the intellect’s -rst operation. 
Rather, the text only speci-es the mode in which the copula “is” signi-es 
when used without quali-cation. Although this paper interprets the esse 
of In peryermenias as merely an idiomatic Latin technique for referring to 
the copula in indirect speech rather than, as Father Régis and McInerny 
suppose, the predicate in so-called “existential propositions,” we suggest 
(but do not develop the idea) that this text may yet be relevant to how we 
understand esse in Aquinas’s metaphysics.
Esse and Judgment in Existential !omism
Jacques Maritain
Although Maritain and Gilson diFered on the epistemological role of esse 
and judgment in answering Cartesian doubt and idealism,9 the two authors 
9   For the epistemological views of the existential /omists, see Gilson, !omist 
Realism; Jacques Maritain, “Critical Realism,” in !e Degrees of Knowledge, trans. 
Gerald Phelan (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Joseph 
Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (Houston, TX: Center for /omis-
tic Studies, 1992). /e secondary literature on the epistemological debate among 
the existential /omists is actually more developed than that on the metaphysical 
interpretation of the existential judgment. For a defense of Gilson and (especially) 
Owens, see John Knasas, Being and Some Twentieth-Century !omists (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2003), esp. 71–128. For a critical evaluation of Gilson’s 
epistemological project, see Brian Kemple, “Evaluating the Metaphysical Realism 
of Étienne Gilson,” Studia Gilsoniana 4, no. 4 (2015): 363–80. Gilson and Marit-
ain’s epistemological diFerences are suggested by Gerald McCool in From Unity 
to Pluralism: !e Internal Evolution of !omism (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1989). For a critical evaluation of Maritain in favor of Gilson, see John 
Knasas, “Transcendental /omist Methodology and Maritain’s ‘Critical Realism,’” 
in Jacques Maritain and the Many Ways of Knowing, ed. Douglass Ollivant (Wash-
ington, DC: /e Catholic University of America Press, 2002). For a reply to Knasas 
in favor of Maritain, see Stephen Chamberlain, “/e Dispute between Gilson and 
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were o7en mutually illuminating concerning the metaphysical relation of 
esse to judgment. Maritain’s initial explanation of the two operations of the 
intellect in A Preface to Metaphysics is helpful for framing the nuances of 
how both authors understand the relation of esse to judgment.
Observe that being presents two aspects. One of these is its aspect as 
essence which corresponds particularly to the -rst operation of the 
mind. . . . /e other is the aspect existence, the esse in the strict sense, 
which is the end in which things attain their achievement, their 
act, their “energy” par excellence, the supreme actuality of whatever 
is. Nor must we suppose that this second aspect, this aspect which 
crowns and perfects being, escapes the grasp of the intellect. . . . It is 
the second operation of the mind, in the judgment, by composition 
and division, that the speculative intellect grasps being, not only 
from the standpoint of essence but from that of existence itself, 
actual or possible. Existence is here apprehended ut exercita, that 
is as actualized by a subject: not merely as presented to the mind, 
as is the case with the simple concept of existence, but as possessed 
potentially or actually by a subject.10
Maritain does not cite from where, in Aquinas, he derives this distinction, 
but he seems to be following the mode of presentation of Scriptum I, d. 38, 
q. 1, a. 3, where Aquinas introduces the two operations of the intellect by 
noting that, “in a thing [res], there are two [aspects]: the quiddity of the 
thing and the to-be of it.”11 Simple apprehension “apprehends” (apprehen-
dit) the quiddity of things, but judgment “comprehends” (comprehendit) 
the esse rei. From what I can tell, this is a unique case in which Aquinas 
connects the second operation to the grammatical direct object, esse, by 
means of a distinctly cognitive verb, like comprehendit. In q. 5, a. 3, of the 
commentary on Boehtius and Scriptum I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7, Aquinas uses 
“respicit ipsum esse rei” and “respicit esse ipsius” instead. /ese formulas 
could still be interpreted in a cognitive way so that the object cognized in 
judgment is esse, but they are less determinately so. In any case, Maritain 
interprets Aquinas to mean that esse is the object cognized by judgment. 
A7er telling us that existence is posited in judgment by the verb, “which 
expresses judgment,” and that it is judgment that “completes and perfects 
knowledge,” Maritain declares:
Maritain over /omist Realism,” Studia Gilsoniana 6, no. 2 (2017): 177–95.
10   Maritain, Preface, 19–20.
11   Aquinas, Scriptum, 1:903–4.
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It is a radical error to restrict the object of the intellect to the object 
of the -rst operation of the mind. Unfortunately a number of popu-
lar expositions of scholasticism seem to represent the matter in this 
false light. /ey speak as though the object of the -rst operation 
constitutes the object of intellection as such. /is is quite untrue. It 
is merely a preparation for the second, which achieves knowledge.
When we a{rm that the object of the intellect is being, an a{r-
mation which displays the profound realism of /omist philosophy, 
we do not stop short at essences. It is to existence itself that the 
intellect proceeds when it formulates within itself a judgment corre-
sponding to what a thing is or is not outside the mind.12
To be precise, Maritain does not, here, explicitly a{rm that esse is the 
object of the second operation. But that is clearly what he intends us to 
understand when he denies that the object of the intellect is reducible to 
the object of the -rst operation and a{rms that judgment goes beyond 
essences to existence. Having presented esse as the object of the intellect’s 
operation of judgment, Maritain shi7s abruptly to the topic of how acts 
of will diFers from judgment. Maritain does not cite any text or prob-
lem justifying this rather unexpected digression. But he presumably has 
passages in mind, like the corpus of De veritate, q. 21, a. 1. Texts such as 
these present a formidable obstacle to what Maritain has just concluded 
about judgment.
In every being, there are two [aspects] to consider—namely, the 
notion [ratio] of the species and the being itself [esse ipsum] by which 
something subsists in that species. And so any being [ens] can be 
perfective in two ways: In one way, according to the notion [ratio] 
of the species only, and thus by being [ens] the intellect, which 
perceives the notion of being [ratio entis], is perfected—nor indeed 
is being [ens] in [the intellect] according to natural being [esse natu-
rale]. And for this reason, this mode of perfecting adds “truth” onto 
“being.” . . . For the truth is in the mind. . . . In another way, being 
[ens] is perfective of another not only according to the notion [ratio] 
of the species, but also according to the being [esse] which it has in 
the nature of things. And by this mode is the good perfective. For 
the good is in things.13
12   Maritain, Preface, 20–21.
13   De veritate, q. 21, a. 1: “In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare, scilicet ipsam 
rationem speciei et esse ipsum quo aliquid subsistit in specie illa. Et sic aliquod 
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/is passage has the same structure as Maritain’s division of the two oper-
ations of the intellect except, rather than distinguishing two intellectual 
operations by the two aspects of being (ens), Aquinas uses these two aspects 
to distinguish the intellect from the will. /e intellect, which “percipit 
rationem entis,” is perfected by a being (ens) according to the ratio of its 
species tantum. In contrast, the will is perfected not only (non solum) by 
the ratio speciei, but also by the esse that a being has in the nature of things. 
/is text seems to positively exclude Maritain’s whole thesis—namely, that 
the object of the intellect is more than essences (species), but also existence 
(esse). If Maritain is to maintain that the object of the intellect is esse as well 
as essence, then how does the intellect diFer from the will? Here we have 
the presumed motive underlying Maritain’s decision to close a section on 
the two operations of the intellect by distinguishing the will from judg-
ment. Immediately following our last quotation from Maritain, he writes:
From this point of view the intellect and the will are on the same 
footing, though there is also a fundamental diFerence between 
the two cases. /e goal of the will is existence precisely as outside 
the mind, as actualised or possessed by reality external to the mind, 
outside the spiritual act of the will. But the intellect and its act are 
ful-lled by existence a{rmed or denied by a judgment, by existence 
attained—as it is lived or possessed by a subject—within the mind, 
within the mind’s intellectual act itself.14
To some extent, this parallels Aquinas’s distinction between intellect and 
will in De veritate, q. 21, a. 1. What the intellect attains (truth) is in the 
mind, but what the will attains (good) is in things outside the mind. Like 
Aquinas, Maritain says that what the intellect attains is in the mind, but 
ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter: uno modo secundum rationem speciei 
tantum, et sic ab ente per-citur intellectus qui percipit rationem entis, nece tamen 
ens est in eo secundum esse naturale . . . verum enim est in mente. . . . Alio modo 
ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei sed etiam 
secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura, et per hunc modum est perfectivum 
bonum; bonum enim in rebus” (Leonine ed., 22:593 [lns. 179–97]). See also, De 
veritate, q. 21, a. 3, corp.: “Verum est prius bono secundum rationem cum verum 
sit perfectivum alicuius secundum rationem speciei, bonum autem non solum 
secundum rationem speciei sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in re” (“Truth is 
prior to good according to reason, since truth is perfective of something according 
to the nature [ratio] of the species, but good is [perfective of a thing] not merely 
according to the nature [ratio] of the species, but also according to the being [esse] 
that it has in the thing”; Leonine ed., 22:598 [lns. 47–51]). 
14   Maritain, Preface, 21.
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what the will attains is outside of it. Unlike Aquinas, however, Maritain 
is not talking about truth and goodness, but about esse as attained by the 
intellect and will, respectively. /is has a rather shocking consequence. 
Although Maritain has just told us that the intellect’s being perfected by 
existence as its object “displays the profound realism of /omist philos-
ophy,” Maritain now says that the existence attained by the intellect is in 
the mind, not outside it. Does this mean that we cannot know existence 
outside the mind? How is this strategy for distinguishing will from intel-
lect compatible with Maritain’s own professed realism? Maritain’s A Preface 
to Metaphysics does not provide answers to these troubling questions. But 
a somewhat plausible answer is implied by Maritain’s later work Existence 
and the Existent (1947). Maritain’s success as an epistemologist in answer-
ing these questions is irrelevant to the present paper. What is relevant is the 
metaphysical implication of this answer for how Maritain understands esse 
in relation to judgment.
In Existence and the Existent, Maritain still maintains that “essences are 
the object of the -rst operation of the intellect, or simple apprehension.”15 
Now, however, Maritain somewhat arti-cially restricts the words “object” 
and “intelligible” to essences, abstracted in the intellect’s -rst opera-
tion.16 But, says Maritain, the function of judgment is to restore essence, 
abstracted from existence by the mind’s -rst operation, back to existence.17 
15   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 19 (see also 11–13).
16   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 13: “In abstractive perception, what the 
intellect lays hold of is the natures or essences which are in existent things or 
subjects (but not in the state of universality or intelligibility in act), which them-
selves are not things, and which the intellect strips of existence by immaterializing 
them. /ese are what, from the very beginning, we call intelligibles, or objects of 
thought.” See also: “/e object is the term of the -rst operation of the intellect 
(simple perception, or ‘simple apprehension’); what is it therefore if not, under a 
given speci-c aspect determined and cut out by abstraction, the intelligible density 
of an existent subject, rendered transparent in act by the mind and identi-ed with 
the mind’s vital activity by and in a concept? BrieQy, the object as present in the 
mind is the intelligible objectization of a trans-objective subject” (11).
17   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 10: “/e intellect, laying hold of the intelli-
gibles, disengaging them by its own strength from sense experience, reaches, at the 
heart of its own inner vitality, those natures or essences which, by abstracting them, 
it has detached from their material existence at a given point in space and time. 
But to what end? Merely in order to contemplate the picture of the essences in 
its ideas? Certainly not! Rather in order to restore them to existence by the act in 
which intellection is completed and consummated, I mean judgment pronounced 
in the words ita est, thus it is. When, for example, I say: ‘In every Euclidean triangle 
the sum of the angles is equal to two right angles,’ or, ‘/e earth revolves round the 
sun,’ what I am really saying is that every Euclidean triangle exists in mathematical 
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For instance, when we say, “the earth revolves round the sun,” for Maritain, 
what we are really doing is restoring the abstract concept “earth” to exis-
tence, by judging that “the earth exists in physical existence as revolving 
round the sun.”18 /at judgment has this existential restorative function, 
rather than an abstractive one, makes Maritain now call into question 
whether existence can be said to be the “object” of judgment.
And yet existence is not an essence. It belongs to another order, an 
order which is other than the whole order of essences. It is therefore 
not an intelligible nor an object of thought in the sense given these 
words (which is synonymous with essence). What are we to conclude 
if not that existence goes beyond the object strictly so called, beyond 
existence as possessing the property described; that the earth exists in physical 
existence as characterized by the movement described. /e function of judgment 
is an existential function.” See also 15.
18   Maritain does not say what motivates this attempt to reinterpret all attributive 
judgments into existential ones. It is likely that he has in mind In V metaphys., 
lec. 9, no. 890, where Aquinas says: “Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad 
diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum 
modum essendi; quia ‘quoties ens dicitur,’ idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, 
‘toties esse signi-catur,’ idest tot modis signi-catur aliquid esse” (“Whence it is 
right that being [ens] is contracted into diverse genera according to a diverse mode 
of predicating, which follow upon a diverse mode of being [modus essendi]. [/at 
is] because ‘in as many ways as being [ens] is said [dicitur]’—that is, in as many ways 
as something is predicated—‘in that many ways is to be [esse] signi-ed’—that is, in 
that many ways is something signi-ed to be”). Other authors, although diFering 
from Maritain in detail, have also taken this to mean that every judgment is some-
how existential: Gyula Klima, “Aquinas’ /eory of the Copula and the Analogy of 
Being,” Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2002): 159–76; Turner 
Nevitt, “Aquinas on Essence and Existence” (PhD diss., Fordham University, 
2015), 152–55. Such an interpretation is undermined, by Aquinas, when, a few 
lines later, he reveals that, by esse, he just means us to understand whatever essence 
is signi-ed by the predicate: “Opertet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse 
signi-cet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse signi-cat substantiam.” See 
Elliot Polsky, “‘In as Many Ways as Something is Predicated . . . in that Many Ways 
is Something Signi-ed to Be’: /e Logic behind /omas Aquinas’s Predication 
/esis, Esse Substantiale, and Esse in Rerum Natura,” Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 95 (forthcoming, 2021). Alternatively, Marit-
ain may not be attempting an interpretation of In V Metaphysicorum, lec. 9, but 
instead Aquinas’s frequent remark that esse results from the coming-together of the 
principles of things, such as matter and from. See, for instance: In IV metaphys., 
lec. 2, no. 558; In Boetium de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, corp. Such texts inspire Owens, 
like Maritain, to reinterpret all attributive judgments as somehow existential 
(Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 49–50).
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the intelligible strictly so called, because it is an act exercised by a 
subject, whose eminent intelligibility, we may say super-intelligibil-
ity, objectivizes itself in us in the very act of judgment? In this sense 
we could call it a trans-objective act.19
Super-cially, this passage seems to contradict what Maritain said earlier in 
Preface to Metaphysics. Since Maritain now restricts the word “object” to 
abstracted essences, he now denies that existence is the object of the intel-
lect. But only a few pages later, Maritain will clarify that we can still call 
existence the “object” of the intellect and that which judgment “confronts” 
so long as we keep in mind that existence is an object in a “higher and 
analogical sense” compared to essences as objects of simple apprehension.20 
/us, just as in A Preface to Metaphysics, Maritain faces the unstated specter 
of De veritate, q. 21, a. 1. If existence is the object of not only the will, but 
also the intellect, how does the intellect diFer from the will? In A Preface 
to Metaphysics, as we saw, Maritain’s solution to this unstated problem was 
to say that the existence attained by the intellect was in the mind whereas 
the existence attained by the will was outside the mind. In Existence and 
the Existent, Maritain does not seem to abandon his view that the existence 
attained in judgment is in the mind, not outside of it. Quoting his own 
earlier Degrees of Knowledge (1932), and commenting thereon, Maritain 
writes:
“Judgment is not content with the representation or apprehension 
of existence. It a{rms existence, it projects into it, as eFected or 
eFectible outside the mind, the objects of concept apprehended by 
the mind. In other words, when the intellect judges, it lives inten-
tionally, by an act proper to itself, this same act of existing which 
the thing exercises or is able to exercise outside the mind.” Existence 
thus a{rmed and intentionally experienced by and in the mind is 
the consummation or completion, in the mind, of intelligibility in 
act. It corresponds to the act of existing exercised by things.21
Here, as in A Preface to Metaphysics, there are clearly two existences—one 
in things, one in the mind. /e one experienced and a{rmed in the mind 
“corresponds” to the one outside the mind. Unlike A Preface to Meta-
physics, however, we now have some indication how this doctrine could 
19   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 15.
20   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 18–9.
21   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 15. 
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be reconciled with Maritain’s professed realism. If truth is, as classically 
understood, the correspondence of the mind to things, and moreover the 
existence in the mind attained in judgment corresponds to existence in 
things, then, plausibly, we can know existence outside the mind by expe-
riencing existence within the mind. But as Maritain warns here, existence 
in the mind should not be seen as a mere abstract representation. So, how 
should we understand the existence obtained in the mind? As Maritain 
says a few lines later, quoting Degrees of Knowledge: “/e intelligibility 
with which judgment deals is more mysterious than that which notions 
or ideas convey to us; it is not expressed in a concept but in the very act 
of a{rming or denying.”22 What Maritain seems to mean is that, whereas 
what is cognized in simple apprehension is a concept—that is, the abstract 
or static term of an intellectual operation—what is cognized in judgment 
is the very act of a{rming or denying, the intellectual operation itself. /e 
object of judgment is not an abstracted form, but the concrete vital oper-
ation of an immaterial form—the intellectual knower himself. /e object 
known in judgment is itself the vital operation of judgment by which, with 
the abstracted essences in the mind, the knower performatively imitates 
(or “lives intentionally”) through judgment the act of existing exercised by 
unabstracted essences outside the mind.
Admittedly, in explaining how Maritain understands judgment in rela-
tion to esse, we have had to interpret Maritain rather than merely quote 
his own plainly formulated opinions. Still, as we turn from Maritain to 
Gilson, we -nd further evidence that our interpretation of Maritain has 
been faithful. Gilson’s understanding of judgment in relation to esse, as 
expressed in Being and Some Philosophers (1949), is strikingly similar to 
Maritain’s understanding. For the purposes of this paper, we need not 
review Gilson’s views in the same detail we gave to Maritain. Rather, we 
will merely highlight some points of similarity to con-rm the faithfulness 
of our interpretation of Maritain to that author and his school.
Étienne Gilson
Like Maritain, before distinguishing the two operations of the intellect, 
Gilson distinguishes two aspects in being: essence and existence.23 A7er a 
lengthy discussion of how these relate to one another, Gilson turns to the two 
operations of the intellect: “/e -rst operation of the mind is to form such 
concepts as express what things are.”24 Gilson, then, goes on to distinguish 
22   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 15. 
23   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 179.
24   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 187.
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two kinds of judgment.25 One applies abstract concepts to their objects. /e 
truth of such judgments depends only on essences, which in themselves are 
merely possible. /us, such judgments do not give us knowledge of actually 
existing things. In contrast, there is a second kind of judgment.
In order to go further, another class of judgments is required, 
namely, those by which we state that what the thing is, actually is, 
or exists. Such is the composite operation which we call a judgment 
of existence. By saying that x is, we mean to say that x is a certain 
esse (to be), and our judgment must needs be a composite operation 
precisely because, in such cases, reality itself is composite. Existence 
is synthetically united with essence in reality, owing to the e{cient 
causality of its cause, and the synthetic nature of their actual relation 
entails the synthetic nature of the mental act whereby we express it. 
If our existential judgment is true, however, it is so because that to 
which we ascribe existence actually is, or exists. In short, it is true 
when the data of abstract, intellectual knowledge and those of sensi-
ble intuition fully agree.26
A7er using the phrase “-rst operation of the mind” to describe our knowl-
edge of essences, Gilson only re-introduces the word “operation” when 
speaking of existential judgments. /is suggests that he is uncomfortable 
including the -rst class of judgments (so-called “attributive judgments”) 
within the second operation of the intellect. If so, this would be a slight 
departure from Maritain, who, as we saw, reduced attributive judgments 
(e.g., “the earth revolves round the sun”) to existential judgments (e.g., “the 
earth exists in physical existence as revolving round the sun”). In any case, 
Gilson—even more clearly than Maritain—takes existence to be the object 
of the intellect’s second operation. He says:
/at the human mind is naturally able to grasp it [the existential 
act] is a fact, and, if so many philosophers doubt it, it is because 
they fail to grasp the cognitive power of judgment. Because it lies 
beyond essence, existence lies beyond abstract representation, but 
not beyond the scope of intellectual knowledge; for judgment itself 
is the most perfect form of intellectual knowledge, and existence is 
its proper object.27
25   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 187.
26   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 187–88.
27   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 202. 
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Like Maritain, Gilson sees essences in the -rst operation of the intellect as 
abstracted from existence and in need of being “restored” thereto for the 
knower to obtain perfect knowledge.
Essences should never be conceived as -nal objects of intellectual 
knowledge, because their very nature is engaged in the concreteness 
of actual being. Abstracted from being, they claim to be reintegrated 
being. In other words, the proper end of intellectual abstraction is 
not to posit essences in the mind as pure and self-su{cient presen-
tations. Even when we abstract essences, we do not do so with a view 
to knowing essences, but with a view to knowing the very beings to 
which they belong, and this is why, if philosophical knowledge is 
not to remain abstract speculation, but to be real knowledge, it must 
use judgment to restore essences to actual being.28
Gilson goes on to explain how this restoring occurs. As we saw, for 
Maritain, the restoration of abstract essences to existence consisted in the 
intellect, by judgment, making the essences in the mind exercise an act 
corresponding to the act of existence those same essences exercised outside 
the mind. In our own words, Maritain saw judgment as a self-conscious 
performative imitation of existence outside the mind. In Gilson, we -nd 
an almost identical account of how judgment restores essences to existence.
Judgments always a{rm that certain conceived essences are in a 
state of union with, or of separation from, existence. Judgments 
unite in the mind what is united in reality, or they separate in the 
mind what is separated in reality. And what is thus united or sepa-
rated is always existence, either how it is, or that it is. In this last case, 
which is that of the judgment of existence, my mental act exactly 
answers the existential act of the known thing. Let us, rather, say 
that such a judgment intellectually reiterates an actual act of exist-
ing. If I say that x is, the essence of x exercises through my judgment 
the same act of existing which it exercises in x.29
To perceive is to experience existence, and to say through judg-
ment that such an experience is true is to know existence. An intel-
lectual knowledge of existence is therefore possible for an intellect 
whose operations presuppose its vital experience, as an existent, of 
28   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 202–3 (cf. Maritain, Existence and the Exis-
tent, 10 [quoted in note 17 above]).
29   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 203.
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another existent. In other words, intellectual knowledge conceives 
existence, but the fruit of its conception then is not the representa-
tion of some essence; it is an act which answers an act. Exactly, it is 
the act of an operation which answers an act of existing, and such 
an operation is itself an act because it directly Qows from an act 
of existing. An epistemology in which judgment, not abstraction, 
reigns supreme, is necessarily required by a metaphysics in which “to 
be” reigns supreme in the order of actuality.30
Some aspects of these quotations are unclear. For instance, whereas Gilson 
earlier seemed to exclude attributive judgments from the second operation 
of the intellect inasmuch as they had nothing to do with existence, now he 
seems to say—more in line with Maritain—that all judgments, attributive 
or existential, have to do with existence. /is ambiguity is irrelevant to 
the present paper. What is relevant is that, like Maritain, Gilson sees the 
act of judgment itself as what corresponds to existence outside the mind, 
grounding the truth of that existential judgment. Maritain distinguished 
between existence exercised by essences outside the mind and existence in 
the mind exercised by abstracted essences in the act of judgment, and he 
said the latter corresponded to the former. Gilson, in a similar way, says that 
there are two acts—the act of existing outside the mind and the act of judg-
ment. /e latter “exactly answers” to the former. For both authors, it would 
seem, that which is cognized in the intellect’s second operation is nothing 
other than the operation itself, which operation is a similitude of the act 
of existing outside the mind. Gilson closes his paragraph concerning the 
existential judgment by quoting Aquinas on Boethius’s De Trinitate (q. 5, 
a. 3): “/e -rst operation pertains to the nature of a thing. . . . /e second 
operation pertains to the being of a thing.”31
In sum, both Maritain and Gilson interpret Aquinas’s division of the 
two operations of the intellect as meaning that the -rst operation has 
a distinct (proper) object from the second operation. Whereas the -rst 
operation cognizes essences, the second cognizes existence. Both authors, 
however, seem to say the way the second operation cognizes existence 
outside the mind is by cognizing itself as a vital activity corresponding to 
(i.e., exactly answering) the existential activity of the existent outside the 
mind. Having reviewed the opinions of the two most prominent existen-
30   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 207–208. /e beginning of this quotation 
closely parallels what Gilson says in !omist Realism, esp. 186–87.
31   “Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei . . . secunda operatio respicit 
ipsum esse rei” (Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 203).
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tial /omists concerning how to interpret Aquinas on the relation of judg-
ment to esse, two things remain for this paper. First, we must evaluate the 
faithfulness of the existential /omist interpretation of Aquinas’s saying, 
“secunda operatio respicit ipsum esse rei.” Second, we must decide whether 
the Régis-McInerny alternative account of esse as cognized in the intellect’s 
-rst operation fares any better than the existentialist theory in which esse 
is cognized in the second operation.
“Secunda Operatio Respicit Ipsum Esse Rei”
Minimally, there is a diFerence in emphasis between Saint /omas’s way 
of distinguishing the two operations of the intellect and Maritain and 
Gilson’s way of doing so. Maritain and Gilson focus almost exclusively 
on the relation between esse and the second operation of the intellect.32 
For Aquinas, this relation o7en goes unmentioned. In contrast, Aquinas 
almost always mentions a relation between the second operation and the 
vocal sound, enunciation (enuntiatio), which signi-es the mind’s second 
operation.33 But Maritain seems to have almost entirely omitted mention 
of enuntiatio. Perhaps, in some cases, Maritain’s “judgment” can be taken as 
a translation of Aquinas’s enuntiatio. But certainly, the primary meaning of 
Maritain’s word seems to be the second operation of the intellect itself, not 
the vocal sound signifying that operation. Gilson seems to deny that the 
logic of propositions (enunciatio) is helpful at all for showing how we know 
esse.34 It is conceivable that Maritain and Gilson’s diFerent emphasis stems 
from a substantive misinterpretation of Aquinas. To see whether this is so, 
let us consider a few passages in which Aquinas distinguishes the second 
operation of the intellect from the -rst.
32   See Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 47: “It has to be a diFerent act 
from conceptualization [that is the means of perceiving that sensible things exist]. 
It can be described and de-ned only in terms of its object, existence. /ings are 
known to exist. /e intellectual act by which existence is directly known is the 
proper way to de-ne this cognition. Technically it may be called judgment.” 
33   For instance, Aquinas mentions composition and division, as well as enunciation, 
in his division of the intellectual operations in In I peryermenias, lec. 1 (Leonine 
ed., 1*/1: 6 [lns. 1–32]); Quodlibet V, q. 5, a. 2, corp. (Leonine ed. 25/1:375 [lns. 
15–30]); ST I, q. 85, a. 5, corp. In none of these passages does he mention a rela-
tion of judgment to esse. In De veritate, q. 1, a. 3 (Leonine ed. 22: 11 [lns. 44–6]), 
/omas mentions that judgment joins and divides and that it “dicit aliquid esse vel 
non esse,” but does not mention enunciatio by that name.
34   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 190–92. See also “Attributive propositions 
are everywhere related to existence, except, precisely, in logic. . . . Existential prop-
ositions, which deal with nothing else than actual existence, are no -tting objects 
of consideration for the logician” (201). 
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First, we will consider q. 5, a. 3 in the De Trinitate commentary. Here, 
Aquinas distinguishes the two operations in order to explain the diFerent 
ways in which the objects of the three most general speculative sciences are 
abstracted or separated from matter. /is text is a paradigmatic instance of 
Aquinas’s distinction between the two operations of the intellect because 
it gives, in one place, most of the details to be found in other texts.
It should be known therefore that, according to the Philosopher 
in De anima III, there is a twofold operation of the intellect: one, 
which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,” in which it 
cognizes about anything, what it is [quid est]; the other, however, in 
which it composes and divides—forming an a{rmative or negative 
enunciation [enunciatio]. And these two operations correspond 
to two [aspects], which are in things. On the one hand, the -rst 
operation pertains to [respicit] the nature itself of a thing, accord-
ing to which the understood thing obtains some grade among 
beings—whether it is a complete thing, as a certain whole, or an 
incomplete thing, like a part or accident. /e second operation, on 
the other hand, pertains to [respicit] the being [esse] itself of a thing, 
which either results from the coming-together of the principles of 
the thing in a composite or which is concomitant upon the simple 
nature of the thing, as in simple substances.35
/e -rst operation is described here as cognizing something—namely, 
the quid est (i.e., the nature, quiddity, or essence) of a thing. /e second 
operation is not described as cognizing anything (although that it cognizes 
something is not denied either). Rather, the second operation is described 
as doing something—composing or dividing. It is also described by its 
eFect: the second operation of the intellect forms an a{rmative or negative 
enunciation. Aquinas goes on to explain that something can be mentally 
35   In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 3, corp.: “Sciendum est igitur quod secundum 
Philosophum in III De anima duplex est operatio intellectus: una que dicitur 
intelligentia indiuisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque quid est, alia uero 
qua componit et diuidit, scilicet enuntiationem a{rmatiuam uel negatiuam 
formando. Et hec quidem due operationes duobus que sunt in rebus respondent. 
Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta 
aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, siue sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, siue 
res incompleta, ut pars uel accidens. Secunda uero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei; 
quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis, uel ipsam 
simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus” (Leonine ed., 
50:147 [lns. 89–105]).
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abstracted or separated from something to which it is joined outside the 
mind either in the -rst operation or in the second. Doing so in the -rst 
operation need not involve falsehood, since by abstracting in this way we 
merely ignore something about a thing. Doing so in the second opera-
tion, in contrast, would involve falsely understanding a thing not to be in 
another when, outside the mind, it is.
/e second operation, which composes and divides, distinguishes 
one from another by this—that it understands [intelligit] one not to 
be in [non inesse] the other. But in the operation that understands 
[intelligit] the quid est of anything, [the intellect] distinguishes one 
from another when it understands what one thing is, while under-
standing [intelligendo] nothing about the other—neither that it is 
with the other nor that it is separated from it.36
Here, if intelligit is taken as synonymous with cognoscit, we have an indi-
cation that something is in fact cognized in the second operation a7er all. 
But what is cognized does not seem to be something distinct from what 
is cognized in the -rst operation. Rather, it seems to be nothing else than 
what is signi-ed by the predicate of an enunciation. And what is signi-ed 
by the predicate of an enunciation is a something (a whole, an accident, or 
a part). For instance, in the judgment that gives us the subject of metaphys-
ics, we either separate substance (being, act, potency, etc.) from matter, or, 
conversely, separate matter from substance (being, act, potency, etc.). Either 
way, it seems the thing signi-ed by the predicate of this separative enuncia-
tion is something understood in the -rst operation of the intellect. So q. 5, 
a. 3 gives no indication that the second operation of the intellect cognizes 
anything apart from what is cognized in the -rst operation of the intellect.
Aquinas’s In peryermenias division of simple enunciation supports this 
conclusion. /ere, he de-nes a{rmative enunciation as enunciatio alicuius 
de aliquo (an enunciation of something about something) and negative 
enunciation as enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo (an enunciation of something 
5om something).37 What is understood or cognized in judgment—that is, 
36   In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 3, corp.: “Secundum operationem qua componit et diuidit 
distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse, in operatione 
uero qua intelligit quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio dum intelligit 
quid est hoc, nichil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab 
eo separatum.” (Leonine ed., 50:148 [lns. 161–67]).
37   In I peryermenias, lec. 8: “Set contrarium apparet ex hoc quod Philosophus 
consequenter utitur nomine enunciationis ut genere: di{niens a{rmationem et 
negationem subdit quod ‘a{rmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquod,’ scilicet per 
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what is signi-ed by an enunciation—is principally that which is signi-ed 
by the predicate, an aliquid, cognized in the intellect’s -rst operation. 
Judgment diFers from simple apprehension not in what is cognized but 
in the way in which it cognizes. Whereas simple apprehension considers 
whiteness in isolation, for instance, judgment considers whiteness as in or 
not in Socrates. Aquinas, here, gives no indication that the object cognized 
by judgment is either esse or the operation of judgment itself.
But if esse is not what judgment cognizes, then what are we to make of 
the word respicit? Each of the two operations is said to respicit a distinct 
aspect in things. /is language is not unique to the De Trinitate commen-
tary, but is also found in Scriptum I, d. 19.38 From what I can tell, this 
formulation does seem to be con-ned to Aquinas’s early works. We have 
translated respicit as “pertains to,” but it could be more literally translated 
as “sees” or “considers.” Translated in this way, it would be easy to conclude 
that the two aspects in things that the two operations severally respicit are 
the respective objects of those two operations. As color is to the eye, so 
quiddities are to the -rst operation and esse is to the second operation. /is 
conclusion seemingly -nds further support from the fact that Aquinas, in 
multiple places, explicitly draws an analogy between quiddities and color. 
Concerning the text in De anima III from which Aquinas originates the 
distinction between the two intellectual operations, he notes that the 
intellect is always true insofar as it understands the quid est of a thing but 
is not always true insofar as it understands aliquid de aliquo. Explaining 
this distinction, Aquinas says:
Aristotle assigns to this the following reason: Because that which 
it is [quod quid est] is the proper object of the intellect. Whence as 
vision is never deceived in its proper object, so neither is intellect 
[deceived] in cognizing quod quid est. Whence the intellect is never 
deceived in knowing that which man is. But as vision is not always 
true in judging of those which are adjoined to its proper object (e.g., 
modum compositionis, ‘negatio uero est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo,’ per modum 
scilicet diuisionis” (“But the contrary appears to be the case from the fact that 
the Philosopher subsequently uses the name of ‘enunciation’ as a genus: de-ning 
a{rmation and negation, he adds that ‘a6rmation is an enunciation of something 
about something,’ namely, in the mode of composition, ‘but negation is an enun-
ciation of something from something,’ namely, in the mode of division”; Leonine 
ed., 1*/1: 44 [lns. 388–96]).
38   In I sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7: “Prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda 
respicit esse ipsius” (“/e -rst operation pertains to the quiddity of a thing; the 
second pertains to its being.”).
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if “the white” is “man” or “not”), so neither is the intellect always 
true in composing something of something [aliquid alicui].39
Aquinas makes essentially the same point in Scriptum I, d. 19, q. 5, but 
instead of saying quod quid est, he substitutes the synonym quidditas rei; 
and instead of using the particular color “white” as a stand-in for the 
proper object of vision, he simply says “color.”40 Likewise, he replaces the 
unwieldy phrase aliquid de aliquo with the more manageable concepts of 
“composition,” “enunciation,” “a{rmation or negation,” and esse. Aquinas 
again makes the same argument in Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 85, a. 6. 
As color is the proper object of vision, so the proper object of the intellect 
is quidditas rei. Accordingly, as the sight cannot err with respect to color 
(unless the eye is damaged), so the intellect does not err in perceiving 
simple quiddities. Rather, falsehood only enters the intellect when it begins 
to compose or divide things with the quiddities it perceives. From these 
three texts—the commentary on De anima III; Scriptum I, d. 19; ST I, q. 
85—there is perhaps good reason to think that, when Aquinas says the -rst 
operation respicit the quiddity of a thing, whereas the second respicit the 
esse of a thing, he has in mind the respective objects of the two operations. 
As color is to sight, so the quiddity is to the -rst operation and esse is to 
the second.
/is conclusion—although a plausible interpretation of q. 5, a. 3, of the 
De Trinitate commentary read in isolation—should not be accepted too 
hastily. First of all, the grammatical direct object of the verb respicit is not 
always the object of either a power or an operation. Sometimes it is merely 
that to which a thing (even an abstract thing) is related. For instance, 
when Aquinas elsewhere says, “For truth pertains to being [esse] simply 
and immediately,”41 he obviously does not intend esse to be the object of 
39   In III de anima, ch. 5: “Et huius rationem assignat quia quod quid est huias 
proprium obiectum intellectus, unde, sicut uisus nunquam decipitur in proprio 
obiecto, ita nec intellectus in cognoscendo quod quid est, unde intellectus 
nunquam decipitur in cognoscendo quod quid est homo set, sicut uisus non 
semper uerus est in iudicando de hiis que sunt adiuncta proprio obiecto, puta si 
album est homo uel non, sic nec intellectus semper est uerus in componendo aliq-
uid alicui” (Leonine ed., 45:227 [lns. 233–42]).
40   In I sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 (Aquinas, Scriptum, 489–50).
41   See ST I, q. 16, a. 4, corp.: “Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et imme-
diate.” See also ST I, q. 26, a. 2, obj. 1 (“Sed bonum dicitur in Deo secundum 
essentiam, quia bonum respicit esse” [“But good is predicated of God according to 
essence because good pertains to being”]); q. 10, a. 1, obj. 2 (“Duratio autem magis 
respicit esse quam vitam” [“But duration pertains more to being than to life”]).
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truth. Surely, truth is neither a power nor an operation to which esse can be 
related as object. Likewise, Aquinas may not want us to think that quid-
dities and esse are the respective objects of the two intellectual operations 
or powers.
Secondly, these texts—In III de anima; Scriptum I, d. 19; ST I, q. 85—
each call quiddity (or quod quid est) the proper object of the intellect and 
color (or white) the proper object of vision. But these are two powers. In 
contrast, the subjects of the verb respicit in q. 5, a. 3 of the De Trinitate 
commentary are two operations, not two powers. Of course, the object 
of a power will also be the object of its operation.42 For instance, as the 
object of vision is color, so too, this act of seeing has for its object this color 
(e.g., red or blue). So conceivably, although respicit is predicated of two 
operations, not two powers, it may yet relate the two subjects to the proper 
objects of two separate powers—the power of cognizing quiddity and the 
power of cognizing esse. Perhaps, when Aquinas speaks of the power called 
“intellect” in these three passages, he is imprecisely designating the power 
from which the -rst operation of the intellect results, but not the power 
from which the second results.
/e problem with such a reading is that the reasoning in the In de 
anima, Scriptum, and ST passages prevents us from understanding the 
two intellectual operations from the De Trinitate commentary as stem-
ming from two separate powers with distinct proper objects. If the second 
operation stemmed from a separate power with its own distinctive object, 
then—per the logic of the three texts—not only would the intellect never 
be deceived in apprehending the quiddity of a thing, it would also never 
be deceived in the second operation. It is precisely in virtue of the fact that 
the second operation somehow goes beyond the intellect’s proper object 
(i.e., quod quid est) that this second operation can err. /us, the two opera-
tions to which respicit is attributed cannot stem from distinct powers with 
distinct proper objects.
But if simple apprehension and judgment cannot arise from distinct 
powers, can they have distinct objects? A7er all, charity and hatred come 
from the same power of will but have diFerent objects, right? It depends 
what is meant by “object,” obiectum. /is word comes from the Latin 
preposition ob and verb iacio.43 /us, its etymology suggests something 
42   See ST I-II, q. 18, a. 5, corp. See also ST I, q. 77, a. 3; De malo, q. 2, a. 4; and 
Steven Jensen, “When Evil Actions Become Good,” Nova et Vetera (English) 5, no. 
4 (2007): 747–64, who both cites and comments on these texts from St. /omas 
(755–56).
43   Joseph Pilsner, !e Speci7cation of Human Actions in St. !omas Aquinas (Oxford: 
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thrown in front of something else so as to block it.44 In general, “object” 
designates nothing else than the term of a relation. Obviously, there is 
no problem saying that simple apprehension and judgment have distinct 
“objects” in this vague and general sense. But what does this diFerence in 
objects amount to?
To explain how the intellect relates to quiddities and esse respectively, 
we must take a brief digression into Aquinas’s distinction among the 
objects of sense, since Aquinas uses this distinction in sense to explain 
the characteristics of the operations of the intellect. Concerning the 
sense-apprehensive powers, Aquinas identi-es three kinds of object: the 
proper object, the common object, and the accidental object.45 Sensation 
is a kind of being-altered, so anything that of itself causes a diFerence in 
the alteration of a sense power is called a “sensible” per se.46 In contrast, 
what makes no diFerence in the alteration of a sense power is only called 
“sensible” accidentally. But there are two ways in which something can 
diFerentiate the way a sense power is altered. Proper objects (e.g., color, 
sound, odor) determine which sense power is altered. For instance, color 
only aFects sight, and sound only aFects hearing. Common objects (e.g., 
quantity, motion, etc.) also, of themselves, alter the sense powers, but in a 
diFerent way. /ese aFect the mode in which the proper objects aFect the 
sense power. For instance, they determine that the color being seen is great 
or small. Such objects are called “common” because they aFect multiple 
senses, not just one. In contrast to per se sensibles, both common and 
proper, what is sensible accidentally does not in any way alter the sense to 
which it is accidental. Aquinas gives two conditions for something being 
called “sensible” accidentally (per accidens).47 First, it must be accidental to 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 73.
44   Pilsner, Speci7cation, 73.
45   ST I, q. 78, a. 2, ad 2: “Magnitudo et -gura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur commu-
nia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae 
sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum” 
(“Magnitude, -gure, and suchlike, which are called common sensibles, are a middle 
between accidental sensibles and proper sensibles, which are objects of sense. For the 
proper sensibles move the sense primarily and per se”).
46   For the mode of division of proper, common, and per accidens sensibles, I follow In 
II de anima, ch. 13 (Leonine ed. 45:120–22). Cf. ST I, q. 78, a. 2, ad 2.
47   See In II de anima, ch. 13: “Viso igitur quomodo dicantur per se sensibilia et 
communia et propria, restat uidendum qua ratione dicatur aliquid sensibilia per 
accidens. Sciendum est igitur quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per accidens 
primo requiritur quod accidat ei quod est per se sensibile, sicut accidit albo esse 
hominem et accidit ei esse dulce, secundo requiritur quod sit apprehensum a senci-
ente: si enim aliquid accideret sensibili quod lateret sencientem, non diceretur per 
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the thing sensed per se, as sweetness is accidental to the whiteness seen in 
the apple. Second, if a thing is to be called “sensible” at all, even acciden-
tally, something must perceive it. Although sweetness is not sensed by the 
eye, except accidentally, if we are to say it is sensed at all, it must at least 
be perceived by something—such as taste, the intellect, or the inner sense 
powers. /us, nothing is, universally speaking, a per accidens sensible. 
Rather, things are only per accidens sensibles with respect to some partic-
ular cognitive power. With respect to some other power, they must be per 
se sensibles.
 In ST I, q. 85, a. 6, Aquinas uses this division of sensible objects to 
explain how error is found in the intellect. Except for a defect in the sense 
organ, the senses never err with respect to their proper object. Sometimes 
they err with respect to the common sensibles. For instance, we might 
mistakenly think that the sun is only the width of our extended thumb 
when, in fact, it is larger than the whole Earth. Even more so, we may err 
by a comparison of the proper object of sense with some per accidens object. 
For instance, someone could see a dark shape (cognized by the eyes) and 
judge that it was a dog (cognized by the intellect), or dangerous (cognized 
by instinct),48 or making the noise being heard (cognized by the ears). Any 
of these three judgments could be true or false, unlike the simple appre-
hension of a dark shape or a dog or danger or barking in isolation. When 
we err in judging about common or per accidens sensibles, the possibility 
accidens sentiri. Oportet igitur quod per se cognoscatur ab aliqua alia potencia 
cognoscitiua sencietis, et hec quidem uel est alius sensus, uel est intellectus, uel uis 
cogitatiua aut uis estimatiua. Dico autem quod est alius sensus, sicut si dicamus 
quod dulce est uisibile per accidens in quantum dulce <accidit albo quod appre-
henditur uisu, per se autem dulce> apprehenditur gustu. Set, ut proprie loquamur, 
hoc non est universaliter sensible per accidens, set per accidens uisibile, sensibile 
autem per se” (“I see therefore how they talk about per se sensibles, whether 
common or proper, but it must be seen for what reason something is called an 
accidental sensible. It should be known, then, that for something to be sensible by 
accident, -rst, it must belong accidentally to what is a per se sensible. For example, 
it befalls the white to be a human and it befalls it [also] to be sweet. Second, it 
must be apprehended by some sense. For if something occurs to a sensible without 
being sensed [at all], it is not said to be sensed accidentally. It is necessary therefore 
that it is cognized per se by some other cognitive potency of the sensing one—be 
that another sense, the intellect, the cogitative power, or the estimative [power]. 
But I say that it is another sense, as [for example] if we say that the sweet is visible 
by accident insofar as the sweet befalls white, which is apprehended by sight, 
whereas sweet is apprehended per se by taste. Properly speaking, however, this is 
not universally an accidental sensible, but a per se sensible and an accidental visi-
ble”; Leonine ed. 45:120–21 [lns. 162–81]).
48   See ST I, q. 78, a. 4, corp.
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for error is evidently occasioned by the plurality of things perceived, one of 
which is accidental to the other. Turning from the objects of sense to those 
of intellect, Aquinas says, as we have already seen, that the intellect cannot 
err concerning its proper object, which is the quiddity of things.49 On the 
other hand, the intellect can err concerning things that surround (circum-
stant) the essence of a thing. Error only occurs when one thing is ordered 
to another by the intellect composing or dividing or reasoning. Aquinas’s 
examples of this are when the intellect applies the de-nition of a circle to 
a triangle and when the intellect composes from simple quiddities a de--
nition that is impossible to instantiate (e.g., a rational winged animal).50
 From this discussion, it is evident that quiddities are the proper object 
not only of one operation of the intellect, but of the whole intellectual 
power.51 /ey compare to the intellect as color compares to vision. Noth-
49   See ST I, q. 85, a. 6, corp.: “Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. 
Unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea 
quae circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum 
ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam ratiocinando” (“/e 
proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Whence concerning the 
quiddity of a thing, speaking per se, the intellect does not fail. But concerning those 
which stand around the essence or quiddity of a thing, the intellect can fail while 
it orders one to another: composing, dividing, or reasoning”).
50   See ST I, q. 85, a. 6, corp.: “Per accidens tamen contingit intellectum decipi circa 
quod quid est in rebus compositis; non ex parte organi, quia intellectus non est 
virtus utens organo; sed ex parte compositionis intervenientis circa de-nitionem, 
dum vel de-nitio unius rei est falsa de alia, sicut de-nitio circuli de triangulo, vel 
dum aliqua de-nitio in seipsa est falsa, implicans compositionem impossibilium, 
ut si accipiatur hoc ut de-nitio alicuius rei, animal rationale alatum. Unde in rebus 
simplicibus, in quarum de-nitionibus compositio intervenire non potest, non 
possumus decipi” (“By accident, it occurs to the intellect to be deceived concern-
ing that which is in composite things, not on account of the organ, because the 
intellect is not a power using an organ, but on account of a composition occur-
ring to the de-nition either [1] when the de-nition of one thing is falsely [said] 
of another, e.g., the de-nition of a circle [said] of a triangle, or [2] when some 
de-nition in itself is false, as implying an impossible composition, e.g., winged 
rational animal. Whence in simple things, in which no composition comes to the 
de-nitions, it is not possible to be deceived”). 
51   See ST I, q. 85, a. 5, corp. (“And similarly the human intellect does not at once 
in the -rst apprehension attain perfect cognition of a thing, but -rst apprehends 
something about it, as the quiddity of the thing, which is the -rst and proper 
object of the intellect” [Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima 
apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de 
ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellec-
tus]); a. 6, corp. (“But the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing” 
[Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei]); In III de anima, ch. 5 
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ing in Aquinas’s discussion of the intellect seems to correspond to the 
common sensible objects.52 On the other hand, the intellect does have 
(“/at which it is [quod quid est] is the proper object of the intellect” [Quod quid 
est est proprium obiectum intellectus]; Leonine ed. 45:227 [lns. 233–42]); In I 
sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 (“/e intellect has true judgment of its proper object 
into which it naturally tends, which is the quiddity of a thing, even as sight is of 
color” [Intellectus habet verum judicium de proprio objecto, in quod naturaliter 
tendit, quod est quidditas rei, sicut et visus de colore]); In peryermenias, lec. 10 
(“But note that the intellect apprehends a thing according to the proper notion 
[ratio] or de-nition; whence in De anima III it is said that the proper object of the 
intellect is that which it is” [Est autem considerandum quod intellectus apprehen-
dit rem intellectam secundum propriam rationem seu di{nitionem; unde et in III 
De anima dicitur quod obiectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est]; Leonine 
ed. 1*/1.50 [ lns. 71–75]). Cf. De ente et essentia: “Being and essence are what is 
-rst conceived by the intellect” [Ens autem et essentia sunt que primo intellectu 
concipiuntur] (Leonine ed., 43:369 [lns.3–4]). It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to explain how this o7-repeated formula is compatible with the other o7-repeated 
formula that the intellect’s -rst and proper object is universal ens. See, e.g.: ST I, q. 
78, a. 1, corp.; q. 79, a. 2, corp.; q. 87, a. 3, ad 1; De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, corp. Given 
the comparative frequency, context, and clarity in which these two formulations 
of the intellect’s object are given, particularly in the mature ST treatise on man, it 
seems that to call ens the proper object of the intellect is less proper than to call 
quiddity that object. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if these formulations 
were incompatible since they o7en occur side by side. A standard, but not unprob-
lematic, attempt to maintain that both quiddity and ens are what the intellect -rst 
and properly knows was given by John of St. /omas (Poinsot): Cursus philosophi-
cus !omisticus, q. 1, a. 3, ed. Beatus Reiser, vol. 2 (New York: Georg Olms, 2008). 
In order to resolve the tension between ens and quiddity as the intellect’s proper 
object, it may be relevant that, as Aquinas says, what ens primarily signi-es is the 
essence or nature of things, which is divided into ten categories: De malo, q. 1, a. 1, 
ad 19; In II sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; In V metaphys., lec. 9. Cf. De ente et essen-
tia, ch. 1 (Leonine ed., 45:369 [lns. 2–18]); ST I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2. Or even more 
precisely it could be said that “being” -rst signi-es substance (In VII metaphys., 
lec. 1, no. 1246). But “substance” means either an individual or its quiddity (no. 
1247), and the reason an individual is a being is because it has a quiddity (no. 
1251). /us, if our intellect is naturally constituted to apprehend things under the 
aspect of being, what this amounts to is a natural aptitude to apprehend things in 
the manner of the quiddity of substance. For an overview of /omistic opinions 
(Cajetan, Poinsot, Gilson, and Maritain) on being as -rst known in Aquinas’s 
thought, see Brian Kemple, Ens Primum Cognitum in !omas Aquinas and the 
Tradition: !e Philosophy of Being as First Known (Leiden: Brill, 2017).
52   Arguably, it is the syncategoreumata, which signify the relation between concepts 
or the mode of signifying concepts, that are analogous to the common sensibles 
for the intellect. But Aquinas does not discuss this. If “esse” is taken as a syncate-
gorematic term, then perhaps “esse” is among the objects of the intellect analogous 
to the common sensibles. William of Sherwood, whose writings St. /omas could 
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something analogous to per accidens objects. But there is a diFerence 
between the sense and the intellect in this regard. Error can occur in the 
senses when a sense (presumably the common sense) compares the proper 
objects of two diFerent senses, which are with respect to each other 
accidental sense objects. For instance, the common sense judges that the 
white thing is also sweet. In contrast, error occurs in the intellect through 
a comparison of two things, both properly apprehended in the intellect, 
such as the de-nition of a circle and the concept of a triangle.53 Unlike 
with error in the senses, there are not two (or three) apprehensive powers 
involved, but only one.54 In the sense, both objects compared in judgment 
are per accidens objects with respect to diFerent senses. So, what should 
we call the per accidens object of the intellect? Should we identify the per 
accidens object of the intellect with the composite that results from its 
activity of composing and dividing (e.g., “the rational winged animal” or 
“the triangle with a term everywhere equidistant from the center”), or, 
alternatively, should we identify the per accidens object with one or both 
of the simple quiddities entering into this composite? Aquinas is not clear 
about this. It is safe to say that, if there is any possibility of error in the 
intellect’s composing or dividing, the objects compared must be accidental 
with respect to each other. On the other hand, we can also safely conclude 
that the objects compared must be (1) per se with respect to the intellect 
itself, or (2) composed of objects ultimately proper to the intellect itself, or 
have accessed, says that “est” is not a syncategorematic term because it consigni-es 
composition with a subject and consigni-cation is not the same as signi-cation 
(Reginald O’Donnell ed., “/e Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood,” Medi-
aeval Studies 3 [1941], 70–71). But this very reasoning implies that “esse” (unlike 
“est”) is a syncategorematic term since, as Aquinas says, in-nitives signify directly 
the inherence in a subject consigni-ed by (indicative) verbs (Leonine ed., 1*/1:26 
[lns. 49–72]). 
53   /is statement is true so long as we add the quali-cation (not relevant to the pres-
ent paper) that the comparison itself of two intellectual objects does not seem to 
be possible without importing, via the copula, the notion of time, which notion 
is proper to the inner senses but accidental to the intellect. See: ST I, q. 85, a. 5, 
ad 2; In X metaphys., lec. 3, no. 1982. Such a reQection on the inner senses seems 
to be what accounts for the evident diFerence between “a winged rational animal” 
(which is an atemporal and accidental compound of per se intellectual objects) and 
“a rational animal is winged” (which is a present-tense enunciation).
54   Aquinas does hint that the inner senses may be involved in judgment and that the 
necessity of introducing reference to time in judgment is the eFect of this reliance 
on phantasms (ST I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 2). We should not underestimate the role that 
this might play in the possibility of erroneous judgments. Nevertheless, to avoid 
unneeded complication, we will overlook it here. 
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(3) reducible to objects per se with respect to some lower cognitive power. 
For instance, (1) is exempli-ed when I say, “man is risible.” But (2) is exem-
pli-ed when I say, “the rational winged animal has three sides.” And (3) 
is exempli-ed by “Socrates is white,” inasmuch as “Socrates” brings in not 
only the intellectual notion of humanity, but also the inner sense cognition 
of individual matter.55 /us, if we are to speak of the second operation of 
the intellect having any object, it will be nothing else than the per accidens 
object of the intellect, which itself is either cognized per se by some power 
or reducible to such per se objects. If esse, then, were the object of the second 
operation of the intellect, it would be the per accidens object of the intel-
lectual power. But if that were the case, it would have to be a composite of 
the intellect’s proper objects or it would have to be cognized per se by some 
other power. Neither of these consequences is true, however. /e ratio of 
esse is supremely simple56 and esse is certainly not the object of any bodily 
sense. It is not a color, a sound, or a past time, for instance. So, although 
the intellect, in its second operation, respicit ipsum esse rei, nevertheless, esse 
is not the object of the intellect—either per se or per accidens. Nor indeed 
is esse the object of any other cognitive power in man. Evidently, we must 
interpret respicit in the De Trinitate commentary as indicating something 
other than the relation of a power or operation to its object.
We may think that the conclusion just drawn goes too far. Surely, “esse” 
must be cognized somehow; otherwise, we cannot use esse in sentences 
or know it at all. But if it is cognized at all, it must be the object of some 
knowing power. Obviously, we do not deny that esse is cognized somehow, 
just as we would not deny that nothingness, blindness, and logical genera 
are also cognized somehow. All that our conclusion above proves is that 
it is not the proper object of the intellect (or any other cognitive power). 
Rather, when the intellect knows it at all, it knows it by reduction to its 
proper object—just as it knows non-beings by reduction to being and in 
the manner of being.57 Aquinas’s psychology requires that we know esse 
only in the manner of quiddity and by reference to quiddity. Esse is not a 
distinct proper object of any human cognitive power.
So, how should we interpret the thesis that judgment “respicit ipsum 
55   In I peryhermeneias, lec. 10: “Nomen Sortis uel Platonis signi-cat naturam huma-
nam secundum quod est in hac materia” (Leonine ed., 1*/1: 51 [lns. 115–17]).
56   Since esse is supremely common, it cannot participate anything in the manner of a 
genus; and since it is abstract, it cannot participate anything in the manner of an 
accident. See In de ebdomadibus, ch. 2 (Leonine ed., 50: 271 [lns. 68–13]). /us, 
esse is supremely simple (Leonine ed., 50:272–73 [lns. 196–258]).
57   In IV metaphys., lec. 1, no. 539–40.
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esse rei”? Evidently, this uses respicit in the very broad sense in which 
even abstract objects, like verum, can be said to respicit esse. Judgment has 
some special relation to esse missing in the -rst operation of the intellect. 
What this relation is has already been suggested. As we saw earlier, what is 
cognized in the second operation of the intellect is the signi-cation of the 
predicate in enunciation. But this is cognized in a new way. Whereas the 
-rst operation cognizes this signi-cation absolutely, the second operation 
cognizes it in relation to a subject. For instance, we no longer cognize 
whiteness alone, but now cognize that whiteness is in Socrates. /is 
comparison of the objects of the -rst operation is signi-ed in the complex 
pronunciation “Socrates is white.” What consigni-es the composition of 
any form (accidental or substantial) to a subject is the verb “is.”58 /us, 
when Aquinas employs a shorthand similar to indirect speech and uses esse 
to refer to the signi-cation of est, he says judgment “respicit ipsum esse rei.” 
/is means nothing more esoteric than that, whereas simple apprehension 
cognizes quiddities simply, judgment cognizes them precisely as compared 
with one another via the word “is” (est). /is comparison of the intellect’s 
proper objects through the verb “is,” moreover, is why the second operation 
(unlike the -rst) can be true or err. It is also why not only judgment but 
also truth itself is said to “respicit esse.” Esse is nothing else than an abstract 
word for the relation of predicate to subject, which it is the distinctive role 
of the verb est to consignify. /is much su{ces to show that the second 
operation of the intellect does not cognize esse and that no cognitive power 
has esse for its proper object. Moreover, the existential /omists seemed 
to think that we know esse by performing the activity of judgment, which 
somehow corresponds to (or exactly answers) the act of existing exercised 
by essences outside the mind. Aquinas, in dividing the two operations, 
has not only given us no indication that esse is what is properly cognized 
in judgment, but has also not given us any sense that, in judgment itself, 
out intellect is somehow reQexively aware of its own operation and corre-
spondence with extramental activity. What judgment knows is principally 
a quiddity signi-ed by a predicate, but it knows it as joined to or separated 
from a subject via the verb “is.” /is is the only sense in which judgment 
“respicit esse.”
In I Peryermenias, Lecture 5.
To con-rm this reading of Aquinas, let us comment on a passage in 
Aquinas’s In peryermenias much invoked in the twentieth-century debate 
concerning whether esse is grasped in the -rst or the second operation of 
58   In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1: 31 [lns. 391–407]).
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the intellect. In commenting on this passage, it is my contention that both 
parties to the dispute are guilty of misreading the text. Because McInerny 
faithfully develops the argument of Father Régis against Gilson but also 
says far more, we will only refer to McInerny when our interpretation 
diFers from his.
/e context of the passage is a lecture designed to explain Aristotle’s 
de-nition of “verb” (uerbum). Amid de-ning the verb, Aristotle remarks: 
“Set si est aut non est, nondum signi-cat. Neque enim esse signum est rei 
uel non esse. Nec si hoc ipsum ‘est’ purum dixeris: ipsum quidem nichil est. 
Consigni-cat autem quandam compositionem quam sine compositis non 
est intelligere.”59 Any English translation that attempts to make this terse 
and obscure passage easily readable will impose an interpretation upon it, 
but the passage can be literally (if awkwardly) translated as follows: “But 
if ‘is’ or ‘is not,’ it does not yet signify. For it is a sign neither of a thing ‘to 
be’ nor ‘not to be.’ Nor if you purely say ‘is’ itself; this indeed is nothing. It 
consigni-es, however, a certain composition, which, without the compo-
nents, is not understood.” Before presenting his own interpretation of this 
text, Aquinas -rst rejects a few false or inadequate interpretations. Due to 
an imprecise translation of which Aquinas was aware, the past interpreters 
evaluated by Aquinas explain why “being” (ens) signi-es nothing, whereas 
the Latin of Aristotle says that “is” (est) signi-es nothing.60 /is discrep-
ancy has little substantive import.
Alexander said that “being” (ens) signi-es nothing because “being” is 
equivocal and divided into ten categories.61 Aquinas objects that “being” is 
not equivocal but analogical, and even if it were equivocal, it would signify 
many things, not nothing. Porphyry’s interpretation is given next.62 He 
said that “being” signi-es nothing because it does not signify the nature 
of anything (natura alicuius rei), but only a certain conjunction. Here, 
Porphyry evidently has in mind the etymological relation between τò ὄν 
and the copula “is” by which subject and predicate are conjoined. Gilson 
makes a similar point, not about “being” (ens), but the copula “is”: “As to 
the ‘copula,’ it is not really a term, because it designates, not a concept, 
but the determinate relation which obtains between two terms. For this 
59   In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:25 [lns. 16b21–25]). For Gilson’s 
interpretation of this, see Being and Some Philosophers, 229. For McInerny’s, see 
McInerny, Being and Predication, 185–87.
60   See McInerny, Being and Predication, 185: “/e Latin translation St. /omas had 
did not translate τò ὄν as being, but as is. St. /omas is aware of this and comments 
on both readings, i.e. ipsum est and ipsum ens.”
61   In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:30 [lns. 314–30]).
62   In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:30 [lns. 331–40]).
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reason the copula cannot be a noun; it is a verb. In point of fact, it is the 
verb is.”63 /e only diFerence between Gilson and Porphyry is that Gilson 
speaks of the copula but Porphyry speaks of “being.” Nevertheless, their 
contentions amount to the same thing, since Porphyry’s statement only 
makes since in light of the close association between “being” and the 
copula. Aquinas rejects this interpretation because ens is a name and est 
a verb. But what signi-es nothing can be classed as neither a name nor 
verb.64 As Aquinas said earlier in the lecture—although there is a special 
sense of “name” (nomen) in which names and verbs are distinguished by 
their mode of signifying—both names and verbs can be called “names” 
broadly inasmuch as what both signify is aliquam rem65 and inasmuch as 
they both set the intellect at rest in its -rst operation.66 Gilson interprets 
63   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 190.
64   What merely signi-es the relation of two other words is neither a verb nor a 
name (In I peryermenias, lec. 5, in Leonine ed., 1*/1:32: [lns. 32–34]; 1*/1:6 [lns. 
35–40]).
65   In I peryermenias, lec. 5: “Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur 
prout communiter signi-cat quamlibet dictionem impositam ad signi-candum 
aliquam rem; et, quia etiam agere uel pati est quedam res, inde est quod ipsa uerba 
in quantum nominant, id est signi-cant, agere et pati, sub nominibus comprehend-
untur communiter acceptis. Nomen autem, prout a uerbo distinguitur, signi-cat 
rem sub determinato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut in se existens; unde 
nomina possunt subici et predicari” (“/us, it should instead be said that name 
here is taken as it commonly signi-es any word that is imposed to signify some 
thing; and because even to do or to su;er is a certain thing, it follows that verbs 
themselves insofar as they name, i.e., signify, to do and to suFer, are comprehended 
under ‘name’ taken commonly. ‘Name,’ however, as distinguished from ‘verb,’ signi-
-es a thing under a determinate mode—namely, as it can be understood in itself 
existing. Whence a name can be subjected or predicated”; Leonine ed., 1*/1:29 
[lns. 244–54]).
66   In I peryermenias, lec. 5: “Dicit ergo primo quod in tantum dictum est quod uerba 
sint nomina in quantum signi-cant aliquid. Et hoc probat, quia supra dictum est 
quod uoces signi-catiue signi-cant intellectus, unde proprium uocis signi-catiue 
est quod generet aliquem intellectum in animo audientis; et ideo, ad ostendendum 
quod uerbum sit uox signi-catiua, assumit quod ille qui dicit uerbum constituit 
intellectum in animo audientis, et ad hoc manifestandum inducit quod ille qui 
audit quiescit” (“He -rst says therefore that it was said that verbs are names only 
inasmuch as they signify something. And this is proved because above it was said 
that signi-cant vocal sounds signify the intellect. Whence it is proper to signi--
cant vocal sound that it generate some intellection in the soul of the hearer. And 
for this reason to show that a verb is a signi-cant vocal sound, he assumes that ‘that 
which he says’ [the verb] ‘constitutes the intellection’ in the soul of the hearer. To 
manifest this fact, he points out that ‘those who hear rest’”; Leonine ed., 1*/1:29 
[lns. 261–70]); “Set dicendum est quod duplex est operatio intellectus . . . ille qui 
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Aristotle’s remark that verbs, by themselves, are names very diFerently 
from Aquinas. For Gilson, this seems to mean that verbs are names in the 
special sense and that verbs signify the abstract nature of action—that “to 
depart” means “departure.”67 For Aquinas, in contrast, the fact that verbs, 
like names, signify aliquam rem and set the -rst operation at rest, need not 
entail that verbs signify an abstract nature. Whereas names (e.g., “depar-
ture”) signify the nature of an action as if existing in itself, verbs (e.g., 
“departs”) signify the same nature, but as issuing from an agent or inhering 
in a subject.68 Verbs (pace Gilson) signify a thing and set the intellect at rest 
in its -rst operation. So, when Aristotle says that “being” or “is” signi-es 
nothing, he (as interpreted by Aquinas) cannot mean to deny that these 
words (a name and a verb, respectively) fail to signify aliquid or aliquam 
rem in the -rst operation of the intellect. He must mean something else. 
Aquinas -nds Ammonius’s interpretation more promising than Porphy-
ry’s and Alexander’s.69 Ammonius says that ens signi-es nothing because it 
does not signify truth or falsehood unless something else is added, thereby, 
constituting a true or false composition. Aquinas thinks that this too, 
however, strays from the obvious sense of Aristotle’s text since the same 
interpretation could be given had Aristotle chosen any random name or 
verb, but Aristotle seems to have picked “being” or “is” as a special case. 
/ere is a special reason why Aristotle chooses to say that “being” or “is” 
signi-es nothing rather than that “running” or “runs” signi-es nothing.
So Aquinas gives an alternative interpretation—explaining in what 
sense both ens and est signify nothing.70 According to this new interpreta-
tion, ens signi-es nothing in the sense that it does not signify a thing to be 
or not to be (“non signi-cat rem esse uel non esse”). We could mistakenly 
dicit nomen uel uerbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam 
operationem, que est conceptio alicuius, et secundum hoc quiescit animus audien-
tis, qui suspensus erat ante quam nomen uel uerbum proferretur et eius prolatio 
terminaretur; non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad secundam opera-
tionem, que est intellectus componentis et diuidentis” (“But it must be said that 
the operation of the intellect is twofold. . . . He who says a name or verb by itself 
establishes the intellect with regard to the -rst operation, which is the conception 
of something; and according to this, the soul of the hearer rests, which previously 
was in suspense before the name or verb was given and its expression terminated. 
But it [i.e., the name or verb] does not constitute the intellect with regard to the 
second operation, which is the intellect composing and dividing”; Leonine ed., 
1*/1:29 [lns. 277–86]).
67   Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 199.
68   In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:26 [lns. 49–72]).
69  In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:30 [lns. 341–64]).
70   In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:30 [lns. 355–76]).
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think that ens did signify something to be, since ens means quod est, and 
we may take quod as referring to some thing (res) while est refers to esse. 
Aquinas does not cite any particular philosophers who have made this 
mistake, but Maritain has since oFered himself for citation. It is Maritain’s 
view in Existence and the Existent that, although concepts of simple appre-
hension usually precede judgment, the -rst activity of the intellect -nds 
concept and judgment arising simultaneously.71 /is is because, according 
to Maritain, the judgment “something exists” provides the very content for 
the concept “being” or “that-which is.”72 As a result, the concept of being 
and essence and the judgment of existence are inseparable.73
As McInerny has already recited in detail (without citing Maritain), 
Aquinas unequivocally rejects such highly unintuitive, existentialist 
readings of the word ens.74 Against such views, Aquinas argues that if ens 
principally signi-ed esse, then it would signify something to be (aliquid 
esse). But, says Aquinas, ens does not principally signify the composition 
imported by the word est; it only consigni-es this composition inasmuch 
as it signi-es a thing (res) having esse. Here, we may take Aquinas to mean 
something profound and metaphysical by esse, but a closer consideration 
will reveal that he is merely using esse in indirect speech to refer to the 
signi-cation of the verb “is,” the proper function of which, as we will see, 
is to consignify a predicate’s composition with a subject. By denying that 
ens signi-es aliquid esse, Aquinas is just denying that the word “being,” said 
alone, actually unites aliquid (or quod) to any other concept via the verb 
“is.” In other words, ens does not signify a judgment.
Aquinas’s reason for agreeing with Aristotle’s aphorism that esse and 
est signify nothing is similar to his reason concerning ens. We will quote 
Aquinas at length here because his argument is pregnant with detail.
71   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 21.
72   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 19–20: “But this concept of existence, of 
to-exist (esse) is not and cannot be cut o; from the absolutely primary concept of 
being (ens, that-which is, that-which exists, that whose act is to exist). /is is so 
because the a{rmation of existence, or the judgment, which provides the content 
of such a concept, is itself the ‘composition’ of a subject with existence, i.e., the 
a{rmation that something exists (actually or possibly, simply or with such-and-
such a predicate). It is the concept of being (that-which exists or is able to exist) 
which, in the order of ideative perception, corresponds adequately to this a{rma-
tion in the order of judgment.” 
73   Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 20–21. Cf. Maritain, Preface, 64–65.
74   See In I peryermenias, lec. 5 (Leonine ed., 1*/1:30–31 [lns. 355–76]). See McIn-
erny, Being and Predication, esp. 186.
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No verb signi-es a thing to be or not to be. /is is proved through 
the verb “is,” which according to itself does not signify something to 
be, although it signi-es to-be. And—because this “to be” itself seems 
[to be] a certain composition, and so this verb “is,” which signi-es 
to-be, can seem to signify the composition in which is truth or false-
hood—to exclude this, it is added that such composition, which the 
verb “is” signi-es, cannot be understood without the components. 
Since the understanding of it [i.e., composition] depends on the 
extremes, if they are not put forth, understanding of the composi-
tion is not perfect such that in it could be truth or falsehood. For 
this reason, [Aristotle] says that this verb “is” consigni-es composi-
tion because it does not principally signify this, but by implication 
[ex consequenti]. For it signi-es that which -rst falls in the intellect 
by mode [per modum] of actuality absolutely. For “is” said simply 
signi-es to be in act, and to this extent, it signi-es by the mode of a 
verb [per modum uerbi]. Because the actuality, which the verb “is” 
principally signi-es, is commonly the actuality of every form or act 
(whether substantial or accidental), it follows that, when we wish 
to signify that any form or act actually is in [inesse] any subject, we 
signify that by this verb “is”—simply according to present time or 
quali-edly according to some other time. And for this reason, this 
verb “is” signi-es composition by implication [ex consequenti].75
McInerny’s interpretation of this passage is the most famous, and thus must 
75   In I peryermenias, lec. 5: “Quod enim nullum uerbum signi-cet rem esse uel non 
esse, probat per hoc uerbum ' est,’ quod secundum se dictum non signi-cat aliquid 
esse, licet signi-cet esse. Et, quia hoc ipsum' esse uidetur compositio quedam, et ita 
hoc uerbum ‘est,’ quod signi-cat esse, potest uideri signi-care compositionem in 
qua sit uerum uel falsum, ad hoc excludendum subdit quod ista compositio, quam 
signi-cat hoc uerbum ‘est,’ non potest intelligi sine componentibus, quia dependet 
dus intellectus ex extremis, que si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus 
compositionis, ut possit in ea esse uerum uel falsum. Ideo autem didt quod hoc 
uerbum ‘est’ consigni-cat compositionem, quia non principaliter earn signi-cat, 
set ex consequenti: signi-cat enim id quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum 
actualitatis absolute; nam 'est’ simpliciter dictum signi-cat esse actu, et ideo 
signi-cat per modum uerbi. Quia uero actualitas, quam principaliter signi-cat 
hoc uerbum ‘est,’ est communiter actualitas omnis forme uel actus, substancialis 
uel accidentalis, inde est quod, cum uolumus signi-care quamcunque formam 
uel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, signi-camus illud per hoc uerbum 'est,’ 
simpliciter quidem secundum presens tempus, secundum quid autem secundum 
alia tempora; et ideo ex consequenti hoc uerbum ‘est’ signi-cat compositionem” 
(Leonine ed., 1*/1:31 [lns. 378–407]).
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be presented -rst before attempting to oFer corrections. McInerny seems 
to take this passage as showing that the verb “is” in existential proposi-
tions—that is, propositions of the form “Socrates is”—signi-es the concept 
of existence in the -rst operation of the intellect. He writes:
In the case of the existential judgment, if existence were not -rst 
conceived, grasped as the term of the -rst operation of the mind 
as to what it is, no existential judgment would be possible. What is 
composed in the a{rmative enunciation which signi-es the exis-
tential judgment “Socrates is,” is precisely Socrates and existence.76
A few important quali-cations must be made. McInerny interprets “quod 
primo cadit in intellectu,” here referred to by Aquinas, as something 
under the aspect of existence—where “existence” is understood not as the 
act really composed with essence late in the science of metaphysics, but 
merely a nominal concept of existence equivalent to “presence to sense.”77 
/us, we are given to understand that the proposition “Socrates is” means 
nothing else than that Socrates is present to my senses. When Aquinas 
76   McInerny, Being and Predication, 188. See also 189: “Against this [position of 
Gilson] we argued that existence can be conceived, that it can be the predicate 
and that the concept of being does not include a judgment. When it is recognized 
that existence is the predicate in such propositions as ‘Socrates is,’ di{culties still 
remain for the student of the texts of St. /omas.” 
77   See McInerny, Being and Predication, 181–84 (esp. 184). For McInerny’s criti-
cism of the view that the distinction between essence and existence at the start 
of metaphysics is a “real distinction,” involving anything more than a nominal 
concept of existence and essence, see 169–71. As McInerny interprets our -rst 
concept of existence as “presence to sense,” so Fr. Brian Davies similarly interprets 
existence (esse) as the capacity of a thing to receive a real rather than nominal de--
nition (“/e Action of God,” In Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour 
of Anthony Kenny, ed. John Cottingham and Peter Hacker [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014], 165–84, at 171–72). Unlike McInerny, Davies does not 
distinguish a -rst (logical) and subsequent (metaphysical) concept of existence. 
A common problem besets the views of both Davies and McInerny. /ey have 
in eFect collapsed Aquinas’s ratio entis into his ratio veritatis. As is well known, 
Aquinas considers the relation from sensible to sense and the relation of known (or 
de-ned) to knower as a relation of reason, not a real relation (see In V metaphys., 
lec. 17). It is just this relation of reason from thing to apprehensive power that 
constitutes the transcendental concept of truth (De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, corp.; q. 21, 
a. 1, corp.). So, it is unclear how McInerny’s account of our -rst concept of being 
and Davies’s account of real being (rather than imaginary being) do not fall under 
Aquinas’s account of transcendental truth, which Aquinas says is logically poste-
rior to the -rst concept of being. 
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says “is” principally signi-es commonly the actuality of every form or act, 
McInerny glosses this as follows: “/e actuality principally signi-ed by this 
verb is or exists is generally the act of any form, whether it be substantial or 
accidental act.”78 /us, McInerny takes the “is” being described by Aquinas 
as equivalent to the verb “exists,” and he thinks that it signi-es an “act” or 
“actuality” over and above form. Such an actuality, called “existence,” is 
what “is” principally signi-es.
/ere are several problems with McInerny’s interpretation of this text. 
/e -rst thing to note is that, if Aquinas’s account of “is” has any rele-
vance for a hypothesized existential sense of that word, it certainly does 
not exclude the copulative sense of “is.” Indeed, Aquinas seems to have the 
copulative sense foremost in his mind. /is is why he can reason from the 
fact, on the one hand, that “is” signi-es the actuality of every form to, on 
the other hand, the conclusion that whenever we want to signify the inher-
ence of any form in a subject, we do so through the verb “is.” Aquinas links 
these two propositions by the logical connector inde.
Another problem with McInerny’s interpretation is how he reads Aqui-
nas’s statement that what “is” signi-es is esse. /is statement is ambiguous 
and can be taken in two ways. On the one hand, we could take it to mean 
that “is” relates to esse as the word “man” relates to human nature. Accord-
ing to this reading, the concept signi-ed by “is” is a particular concept—
the concept of existence (esse)—predicated of a subject either directly or 
denominatively. /us, a judgment of the form “Socrates is” would function 
to conjoin what is understood by “Socrates” with existence itself, which 
is what is signi-ed by “is.” /is seems to be McInerny’s reading of this 
passage. But cautioning against such a reading is the fact that Aquinas has 
been using esse in indirect speech to refer to the judgment (or part of the 
judgment) that something is. Moreover, we know that “is,” here, includes 
the copulative sense of that word—regardless of whether or not it excludes 
any hypothesized existential sense. /us, when Aquinas says that “is” 
signi-es esse, he is not picking out some particular concept signi-ed by “is.” 
Rather, he is saying that “is” does not signify the whole enunciation aliquid 
esse aliquid (or aliquid esse), but only whatever the esse part of that enunci-
ation signi-es.79 We have yet to be told what particular concept is signi-ed 
78   McInerny, Being and Predication, 187.
79   /is is also why Aquinas can jump from saying that “is” signi-es esse to the theory 
that “is” signi-es composition. A7er all, the role of esse in the judgment aliquid esse 
is nothing else but to relate aliquid to some unspeci-ed predicate. We should add 
that it is hardly a stretch to see an implied predicate, such as aliquid, in Aquinas’s 
sentence “aliquid esse,” when Aquinas himself does much the same thing while 
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by “is” or “to be.” All we know from the assertion that “is” signi-es esse is 
that “is” does not signify a whole enunciation.80
A similar confusion could occur concerning Aquinas’s use of the words, 
“actuality” and “in act.” In the passage under discussion, Aquinas asserts 
that “is” principally signi-es: (1) quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum 
actualitatis absolute; (2) esse actu; and (3) communiter actualitas omnis 
forme uel actus, substancialis uel accidentalis. /ese seem to be diFerent 
formulations of the same contention. In each case, we must ask whether the 
notion of actualitas or actu enters into the very content of what is signi-ed 
by “is” in an enunciation. Once again McInerny—who seems to answer 
this question a{rmatively—must serve as a foil to our own interpretation. 
As we saw, McInerny says: “/e actuality principally signi-ed by this verb 
is or exists is generally the act of any form, whether it be substantial or 
accidental act.”81 Super-cially, this seems to be a close paraphrase of what 
Aquinas himself said in the quotation under discussion. But McInerny, 
here, makes several important changes to what Aquinas has said. First, 
he adds the verb “exists” to “is” as if these are the same. /is implies that, 
in this passage, Aquinas is not talking about “is” as the copula, but as the 
primary predicate of an existential proposition. We have already suggested 
why this assumption should be rejected. Second, whereas Aquinas said “is” 
signi-es the actuality of every form or act, McInerny says that the actuality 
signi-ed by “is” is itself the act of any form. /is interpretive move implies 
interpreting Aristotle in another place. In I peryermenias, lec. 5: “Non est autem 
intelligendum quod per hoc quod dixit: ‘quod est’ et ‘quod non est’ sit referendum 
ad solam existenciam uel non existentiam subiecti, set ad hoc quod res signi-cata 
per predicatum insit uel non insit rei signi-cate per subiectum; nam, cum dico: 
‘Coruus est albus,’ signi-catur ‘quod non est esse,’ quamuis ipse coruus sit res 
existens” (“It should not be understood that, when he says ‘what is’ and ‘what is 
not,’ he is referring only to the existence or non-existence of the subject, but to the 
fact that the thing signi-ed by the predicate ‘is in’ or ‘is not in’ the thing signi-ed 
by the subject; for when I say, ‘the raven is white,’ this signi-es ‘what-is-not to be’ 
although the raven itself is an existing thing”; Leonine ed., 1*/1:47 [lns. 63–70]).
80   If this passage has relevance not only for the copulative sense of “is” but also for 
“is” as a principal predicate, then our interpretation of how Aquinas uses esse 
excludes not only McInerny’s interpretation of esse, but Patrick Lee’s as well. For 
Lee, sentences with “is” as the principal predicate, use “is” as a second-order way 
of referring to a complete sentence, such as “Socrates is a man” (Lee, “Existential 
Propositions in the /ought of St. /omas Aquinas,” !e !omist 52, no. 4 [1988]: 
605–26, at 613–14). For Aquinas, however, as we have just seen, neither “is” nor 
esse signi-es a complete sentence. /is, as we just saw, is precisely the reason why 
Aquinas asserts “is” signi-es “to be.”
81   McInerny, Being and Predication, 187.
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that what is signi-ed by “is” is some act over and above form. It also implies 
that, by the abstract word “actuality,” Aquinas intends us to understand 
some concrete act—presumably, the act of existence or presence to sense 
logically contrasted with essence earlier in McInerny’s essay. /e alter-
native to McInerny’s interpretive suggestions here is that when Aquinas 
says “is” signi-es the actuality of form or act, he is using the abstract word 
“actuality” quite precisely to signify not some concrete act, but rather that 
whereby the “form or act” being predicated of a subject has the character of 
an act. I think this latter reading is more plausible. /ird, in (1), Aquinas 
says what the intellect signi-es is per modum actualitas. In (3), however, 
he says that what it signi-es is actualitas. It cannot be the case that both 
of these mutually exclusive formulations are equally proper. McInerny 
follows the second formulation. /us, whereas Aquinas seems to take actu-
ality not as itself what is signi-ed, but as the determinate mode in which 
“is” signi-es something besides actuality, McInerny implies that what “is” 
signi-es is itself actuality. Again, McInerny presumably has in mind that 
“is” signi-es the act (or actuality) of existence or presence to sense.
Several things serve to undercut this last aspect of McInerny’s read-
ing. First, the fact that Aquinas even once says that what “is” signi-es is 
per modum actualitas, as opposed to actualitas itself, makes it clear that 
actualitas does not enter into the content of what “is” signi-es. /e same 
conclusion can be reached from the fact that Aquinas, in (2), says that 
what “is” signi-es is esse actu. /e ablative form of actu here forces us to 
deny that actuality itself is what “is” principally signi-es. Rather, “in act” 
determines the mode in which “is” signi-es whatever it is that it signi-es. 
/is can be shown by an example. When we say, “Socrates is literate,” this 
can mean either that Socrates is actually literate or potentially so. What 
“is” signi-es simply is literacy in Socrates per modum actualitas, not per 
modum potentialitas. If we switched “is” to past or future tense or added 
some modal quali-er, such as “possibly,” then “is” would no longer signify 
literacy per modum actualitas, but only per modum potentialitas.
In sum, this remarkable text from In peryermenias has historically been 
taken as a dividing line between so-called existential and Aristotelian 
/omists. Existential /omists assert that esse is apprehended -rst in 
judgment, not the -rst operation of the intellect. Against such a theory 
stands lecture 5 of In peryermenias, a text well-beloved by Father Régis and 
McInerny, in which Aquinas says in the clearest language that verbs signify 
concepts in the -rst operation of the intellect, and that “is” is a verb, and 
that “is” signi-es esse. Apparently, this is proof positive that the existential-
ists are wrong. Our contention in this section has not been to show that 
the existentialists are correct, but only that McInerny’s school is also incor-
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rect. It is incorrect inasmuch as it imagines Aquinas to be asserting that 
“is” signi-es a particular concept of “actuality” or “existence” in the -rst 
operation. /e truth of the matter is much less philosophically momen-
tous. When Aquinas says “is” signi-es esse, he merely intends to deny 
that it signi-es the whole enunciation aliquid esse. What “is” signi-es is 
nothing more than what the esse portion of aliquid esse signi-es, whatever 
that unspeci-ed signi-cation is. Likewise, when Aquinas says “is” signi-es 
actualitas, he does not mean that “is” signi-es some act of form. Again, 
Aquinas has not told us the content of what “is” signi-es. Rather, what 
he means is that, whatever it is that “is” signi-es directly, “is” principally 
signi-es this something per modum actualitas. /roughout this famous 
passage, Aquinas seems to have in mind the copula “is” and he seems to use 
the word “is” alone to stand for the whole predicate. /us, what Aquinas 
presumably means by saying that “is” signi-es per modum actualitas or esse 
actu is nothing else than that “is” (or “is white”) signi-es the predicated 
form (e.g., “white,” “man”) as joined to the subject per modum actualitas 
unless some temporal or modal quali-er is added.
Conclusion
/us far, then, we have shown -rst, against the existential /omists—
Maritain and Gilson—that esse is not, for Aquinas, the object of the second 
operation of the intellect. It cannot be said to be what that operation 
properly cognizes. Rather, what the second operation properly and prin-
cipally cognizes seems to be whatever is signi-ed in the -rst operation of 
the intellect by the predicate of an enunciation. In the enunciation “man 
is risible,” for instance, the second operation cognizes risibility principally. 
It diFers from the -rst operation not by cognizing something new, but by 
cognizing something old in a new way. Now risibility is not cognized alone, 
but precisely as in a subject—namely, humanity. /e traditional answer to 
existential /omism, embodied in the writings of Father Régis and Ralph 
McInerny, has been to say that esse is cognized not in the second operation, 
but in the -rst. /e implicit or unstated suggestion of Father Régis and 
McInerny in asserting this is that existence or esse (at least as nominally 
de-ned) falls within the proper object of the -rst operation of the intellect. 
While we do not dispute that the word “esse” must have some meaning in 
the -rst operation if it is to enter into sentences as a subject or predicate, we 
have merely argued that the text from Aquinas’s In peryermenias suppos-
edly describing what this existential meaning is, does not in fact do so. /e 
intent of that text is not to tell us that “is” signi-es the concept of existence 
or actuality in the -rst operation of the intellect. Rather, the intent of that 
text is merely to say that, whatever the copula “is” signi-es, it does not 
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signify a complete enunciation, but rather some concept connected to 
a subject per modum actualitas unless some quali-cation is added. /us, 
although, in agreement with McInerny, it must be granted that the word 
“esse” as used for something contrasted with essence signi-es some concep-
tion of the -rst operation; nevertheless, given that Aquinas says that the 
proper object of the intellect is quidditas rei, it is doubtful that the concept 
signi-ed by esse falls within the proper object of the intellect and its -rst 
operation any more directly than the concepts signi-ed by “blindness” and 
“genus” fall within that proper object.
Given our rather deQationary reading of esse in Aquinas’s In peryerme-
nias, we may wonder whether the esse used there can have any connection 
with the esse contrasted with essence in Aquinas’s metaphysics. Against 
Maritain, Monsignor John Wippel famously distinguishes between an 
“act” sense of esse and a “fact” sense.82 Certainly, our reading of esse in In 
peryermenias would locate Aquinas’s usage there squarely within what 
Wippel calls the “fact” sense of esse, not the metaphysical “act” sense. 
Yet, the striking similarity between, on the one hand, In peryermenias, in 
which Aquinas says “is” signi-es esse and the actuality of every form, and, 
on the other hand, Aquinas’s metaphysical treatments of esse elsewhere as 
the actuality of all acts, even of forms,83 should make us wonder whether, 
in the thought of Aquinas, there is anything besides the “fact” sense of esse 
at all. /is question—as well as a clari-cation of what precisely is meant by 
the “fact” sense of esse—must be le7 to future research.
82   John Wippel, “Maritain and Aquinas on Our Discovery of Being,” Studia Gilsoni-
ana 3 (2014): 415–43. For an excellent summary of the historical development of 
the act–fact distinction in the debate among Wippel, Owens, and Cornelio Fabro, 
see Kevin White, “Act and Fact: On a Disputed Question in Recent /omistic 
Metaphysics,” !e Review of Metaphysics 68, no. 2 (2014): 287–312. Concerning 
Wippel’s contribution to this debate, White focuses on “Truth in /omas Aqui-
nas, Part II,” !e Review of Metaphysics 43, no. 3 (1990): 543–67, which expresses 
essentially the same doctrine as his “Maritain and Aquinas on Our Discovery of 
Being.”
83   ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.
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